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INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has contin-
uously expanded the scope and reach of trademark protection in the EU. With
the challenges arising in the digital environment, however, this expansionist
approach becomes more and more questionable. The current problems arising
from keyword advertising shed light on areas of overbroad, excessive trade-
mark protection created by the Court. Moreover, inconsistencies in the Court’s
system of infringement criteria clearly come to the fore. Against this back-
ground, the present analysis explores ways out of the dilemma.
After a short introduction to basic notions of EU trademark law (section 1),
the problematic expansion of trademark protection in recent years (sections 2
and 3), and current problems arising in the digital environment (section 4),
will be analysed in more detail. Addressing potential solutions, it will be
argued that in spite of current difficulties, it would be naive to assume that the
Court is prepared to restrict the scope of EU trademark law to traditional
protection against confusion with only minor extensions concerning dilution
(section 5). Instead, the need for an appropriate, more flexible limitation infra-
structure will be emphasized (section 6 and concluding section 7).
1. BASICS
According to traditional trademark theory, trademarks primarily serve the
purpose of indicating the commercial origin of goods and services offered in
the marketplace.1 The CJEU refers to
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1 For an overview of trademark functions, pointing out this traditional focus on
identification and distinction functions and potential extensions with regard to commu-
nication, investment and advertising functions, see R. Keim (2009), Der marken-
rechtliche Tatbestand der Verwechslungsgefahr, Baden-Baden: Nomos, pp. 37–61.
the essential function of the trade mark, which is to guarantee the identity of the
origin of the trade-marked product to the consumer or final user by enabling him to
distinguish without any possibility of confusion between that product and products
which have another origin.2
To enable trademarks to fulfil the essential origin function, trademark law
offers enterprises the opportunity to establish an exclusive link with a distinc-
tive sign. As a result, the protected sign is rendered capable of functioning as
a source identifier in trade. In this way, trademark law guarantees market
transparency. It ensures fair competition, protects consumers against confu-
sion and contributes to the proper functioning of market economies by allow-
ing consumers to clearly express their preference for a particular product or
service. From an economic perspective, it can be added that the clear indica-
tion of the commercial origin of goods and services reduces consumers’ search
costs.3
To enable trademarks to fulfil this essential origin function, defensive4
protection is sufficient. As long as the trademark owner is capable of prevent-
ing other traders from using identical or similar signs for identical or similar
goods or services, the clear identification of the commercial source of goods
and services can be guaranteed. As highlighted by the CJEU, the protection of
trademarks as identifiers of commercial source aims at the exclusion of ‘any
possibility of confusion.’5 Accordingly, this protection is to be granted only if
use of a conflicting sign is likely to cause confusion.6 In cases of double iden-
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2 For an early use of this formula, see CJEU, 3 December 1981, case C-1/81,
Pfizer v Eurim-Pharm, para. 8. As to the reappearance of the same formula in later
judgments, see particularly CJEU, 12 November 2002, case C-206/01, Arsenal/Reed,
para. 48. Cf. I. S. Fhima (2005), ‘How Does “Essential Function” Doctrine Drive
European Trade Mark Law?’, IIC, 36, 401.
3 With regard to the search costs argument, see J. Griffiths (2008), ‘A Law-and-
Economic Perspective on Trade Marks’, in L. Bently, J. Davis and J.C. Ginsburg (eds),
Trade Marks and Brands – An Interdisciplinary Critique, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, p. 241; M. Strasser (2000), ‘The Rational Basis of Trademark
Protection Revisited: Putting the Dilution Doctrine into Context’, Fordham Intellectual
Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal, 10, 375, 379–82. With regard to ques-
tions arising in the digital environment, see S.L. Dogan and M.A. Lemley (2004),
‘Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs on the Internet’, Houston Law Review, 41,
777.
4 This protection is defensive in the sense that it aims at the prevention of
confusing use and is not concerned primarily with the exploitation of brand value as an
enterprise’s intellectual property asset. Cf. M.R.F. Senftleben (2009), ‘The Trademark
Tower of Babel – Dilution Concepts in International, US and EC Law’, IIC, 40, 45, 47,
online available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1723903.
5 See the references provided supra, note 2.
6 Apart from the introduction of ‘absolute protection’ in cases of sign and prod-
tity (an identical sign used for an identical product), this risk of confusion may
be deemed so obvious that it can be presumed.7 However, this presumption
must not be misunderstood as a departure from the general requirement to
show that confusion is likely to arise from the use at issue.
Given these clear conceptual contours of traditional trademark protection
against confusion, it is not surprising that agreement on this limited scope of
protection was reached in the European Union. By virtue of Art. 5(1) of the
Trademark Directive (TMD),8 the grant of this basic protection is mandatory
in all EU Member States. It gives trademark owners limited control over
communication concerning their marks – control that only covers the identifi-
cation and distinction of the goods or services they offer in the marketplace.
According to the CJEU, the condition of a likelihood of confusion may be
satisfied where the public confuses the sign and the mark in question (direct
confusion), or where the public makes a connection between the proprietors of
the sign and those of the mark and confuses them (indirect confusion).9
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uct identity (which will be dealt with below), this basic requirement is clearly reflected
in Recital 11 of the EU Trademark Directive:
The likelihood of confusion, the appreciation of which depends on numerous
elements and, in particular, on the recognition of the trade mark on the market, the
association which can be made with the used or registered sign, the degree of simi-
larity between the trade mark and the sign and between the goods or services iden-
tified, should constitute the specific condition for such protection.
7 At the international level, this concept of presuming a likelihood of confusion
in cases of double identity is clearly reflected in Art. 16(1) TRIPS:
The owner of a registered trademark shall have the exclusive right to prevent all
third parties not having the owner’s consent from using in the course of trade iden-
tical or similar signs for goods or services which are identical or similar to those in
respect of which the trademark is registered where such use would result in a like-
lihood of confusion. In case of the use of an identical sign for identical goods or
services, a likelihood of confusion shall be presumed.
8 Directive 2008/95/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22
October 2008, to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks
(codified version) (OJ 2008 L 299, 25), which entered into force on 28 November
2008, and repealed the earlier Directive 89/104/EEC of the Council of 21 December
1988.
9 See CJEU, 11 November 1997, case C-251/95, Puma/Sabel, paras 16–26. For
an overview of the EU approach to anti-confusion protection, see G. Würtenberger
(2002), ‘Risk of Confusion and Criteria to Determine the Same in European
Community Trade Mark Law’, EIPR 20. For critical comments on the need for addi-
tional anti-dilution protection, see J.T. McCarthy (2004), ‘Dilution of a Trademark:
European and United States Law Compared’, The Trademark Reporter, 94, 1163,
1170–2, online available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1350045.
Moreover, trademarks with a particularly distinctive character may give rise to
a greater likelihood of confusion.10 The EU concept also covers post sale
confusion that might arise after the place of purchase with a clear notice
concerning the commercial origin of goods has been left.11
2. EXTENSIONS
In all these cases, EU protection against confusion can be understood to serve
the rather defensive purpose of preventing competitors from use that would
interfere with the basic communication of information about the commercial
origin of goods and services offered by the trademark owner. It is this preven-
tion of confusing use that constitutes the core rationale of protection.12
Nonetheless, the exclusive rights necessary for ensuring protection against
confusion can be used strategically by the trademark owner to realize addi-
tional benefits. To allow trademarks to convey reliable information on the
commercial origin of goods or services, it is indispensable to reserve use of the
trademark exclusively for the trademark owner in all market segments where
use of identical or similar signs could lead to confusion.13 As a result, the
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10 CJEU, 11 November 1997, case C-251/95, Puma/Sabel , para. 24. The degree
of distinctiveness is one of the factors to be considered in the framework of the
infringement analysis. See CJEU, 29 September 1998, case C-39/97, Canon/Cannon;
CJEU, 22 June 1999, case C-342/97, Lloyd/Loint’s.
11 See CJEU, 12 November 2002, case C-206/01, Arsenal/Reed, para. 57, with
regard to cases of double identity.
12 For an alternative view, emphasizing the attention devoted to the trademark
owner’s interest in exploiting brand value in the context of protection against confu-
sion, see T. Cohen Jehoram and H. Van Helden (2011), ‘Bekend, bekender, bekendst:
Goodwill-bescherming van merken’, in Benelux Office for Intellectual Property (ed.),
In Varietate Concordia? National and European Trademarks Living Apart Together,
The Hague: Benelux Office for Intellectual Property, 111; M. Buydens, ‘Pouvoir
distinctif de la marquee et risque de confusion: larvatus prodeo?’, in Benelux Office for
Intellectual Property, ibid, p. 33; A.A. Quaedvlieg (2007), ‘Verwaterd of verward, een
kwestie van bekendheid?’, in D.J.G. Visser and D.W.F. Verkade (eds.), Een eigen,
oorspronkelijk karakter – Opstellen aangeboden aan prof. mr. Jaap H. Spoor,
Amsterdam: DeLex, p. 275.
13 In the case of collective trademarks, this exclusive reservation of a sign
concerns an association of enterprises who use the trademark in trade. The basic mech-
anism, however, remains unchanged. The information conveyed via the trademark, by
contrast, will focus on certain product characteristics rather than one particular
commercial origin. Cf. A. Peukert (2011), ‘Individual, Multiple and Collective
Ownership of Intellectual Property Rights – Which Impact on Exclusivity?’, in A. Kur
and V. Mizaras (eds), The Structure of Intellectual Property Law: Can One Size Fit
All?, Cheltenham UK and Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing, online avail-
able at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1563990.
trademark owner obtains an exclusive channel of communication in several
areas of the market. In principle, only the enterprise holding trademark rights
is entitled to convey information to consumers via the trademark in this
protected area.14
Through investment in advertising, the trademark owner can easily use this
exclusive communication channel to add messages that are unrelated to the
underlying objective of ensuring accurate information about the commercial
source of goods or services. In particular, an enterprise can start advertising
campaigns to teach consumers to associate a certain attitude or lifestyle with
the trademark.15 The moment a trademark ‘speaks’ to consumers about a
particular image that can be associated with the trademarked product,
consumers no longer simply buy products from a particular source. They also
buy the respective ‘trademark experience’ and ‘brand image.’16
Inevitably, the exclusive rights necessary to ensure protection against
confusion, therefore, also protect the investment made in the creation of a
favourable trademark image. Basic protection against confusion safeguards
the exclusive link between an enterprise and its trademark. In this way, it also
offers legal security for substantial investment in the evocation of brand-
related associations in the minds of consumers. The WTO Panel dealing with
EC protection for trademarks and geographical indications for agricultural
products and foodstuffs described this protection reflex as follows:
The function of trademarks can be understood by reference to Article 15.1 [TRIPS]
as distinguishing goods and services of undertakings in the course of trade. Every
trademark owner has a legitimate interest in preserving the distinctiveness, or
capacity to distinguish, of its trademark so that it can perform that function. This
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14 As in other fields of intellectual property protection, it is indispensable to set
certain limits to the exclusive rights of trademark owners. The principle of an exclusive
communication channel, therefore, is limited in several respects. See the general limi-
tations set forth in Art. 6 TMD. With regard to comparative advertising, see CJEU, 12
June 2008, case C-533/06, O2/Hutchison, para. 45; CJEU, 18 June 2009, case C-
487/07, L’Oréal/Bellure, para. 54.
15 Cf. R.S. Brown (1999), ‘Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal Protection
of Trade Symbols’, Yale Law Journal, 108, 1619, 1619–20; K.H. Fezer (2003),
‘Entwicklungslinien und Prinzipien des Markenrechts in Europa – Auf dem Weg zur
Marke als einem immaterialgüterrechtlichen Kommunikationszeichen’, Gewerblicher
Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht, 457, 461–2; S. Casparie-Kerdel (2001), ‘Dilution
Disguised: Has the Concept of Trade Mark Dilution Made its Way into the Laws of
Europe?’, EIPR, , 185, 185–6; M. Lehmann (1986), ‘Die wettbewerbswidrige
Ausnutzung und Beeinträchtigung des guten Rufs bekannter Marken, Namen und
Herkunftsangaben – Die Rechtslage in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland’,
Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht International, 6, 14–17.
16 See J.E. Schroeder (2008), ‘Brand Culture: Trade Marks, Marketing and
Consumption’, in Bently, Davis and Ginsburg, supra note 3, p. 161.
includes its interest in using its own trademark in connection with the relevant
goods and services of its own and authorized undertakings. Taking account of that
legitimate interest will also take account of the trademark owner’s interest in the
economic value of its mark arising from the reputation that it enjoys and the qual-
ity that it denotes.17
The WTO Panel was not called upon to discuss the protection of trademark
reputation and brand image in more detail. It could content itself with the indi-
cation of a connection between the protection of trademark distinctiveness and
trademark repute. The delicate question to be answered in advanced trademark
protection systems, such as the EU system, however, is whether – in addition
to the described protection reflex inherent in basic protection against confu-
sion – the creation of a brand image should additionally be rewarded with
enhanced protection covering cases of dilution.18 In other words: does the
marketing effort made by the trademark owner justify an additional layer of
protection against dilution besides the basic protection against confusion?
The problem with this additional layer of protection is that the creation of
a brand image is a selfish endeavour. When a trademark triggers a whole
bundle of lifestyle messages and positive associations, the trademark experi-
ence itself becomes an independent product for which consumers are willing
to pay. Realizing the economic potential of the trademark, the brand owner
will seek protection for the brand image as such.19 Once sufficient protection
is acquired, the marketing and commercialization of the brand can easily be
extended to additional products. The owner of a prestigious clothing brand, for
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17 See WTO Panel, 15 March 2005, WTO Document WT/DS174/R, para. 7.664,
based on a complaint by the US. A second and almost identical report, WTO Document
WT/DS290/R, deals with a parallel complaint by Australia. The reports are online
available at www.wto.org. For a discussion of the reports, see M.R.F. Senftleben
(2006), ‘Towards a Horizontal Standard for Limiting Intellectual Property Rights? –
WTO Panel Reports Shed Light on the Three-Step Test in Copyright Law and Related
Tests in Patent and Trademark Law’, IIC, 37, 407, online available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1723871.
18 With regard to the basis of this discussion in trademark law, see F.I. Schechter
(1927), ‘The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection’, Harvard Law Review, 40, 813.
With regard to current problems, see Casparie-Kerdel, supra note 15; McCarthy, supra
note 9; Senftleben, supra note 4; G. Bonet (2010), ‘La protection de l’image de la
marquee dans la jurisprudence de la Cour de Justice’, in C. Geiger and J. Schmidt-
Szalewski (eds), Les défis du droit des marques au XXIe siècle, Strasbourg: Litec, p.
105; G.B. Dinwoodie, M.D. Janis (2006), ‘Dilution’s (Still) Uncertain Future’,
Michigan Law Review First Impressions, 105, 98.
19 See the position taken by the US Supreme Court, Moseley v V Secret
Catalogue (‘Victoria’s Secret’), 537 U.S. 418 (2003): ‘[u]nlike traditional infringement
law, the prohibitions against trademark dilution are not the product of common-law
development, and are not motivated by an interest in protecting consumers.’
instance, may consider also selling jewellery and perfume under the trademark
or decide to grant licences for this purpose. Through product diversification of
this type, the revenue accruing from the creation of a powerful brand can be
maximized.20
As a result of these marketing strategies, trademark rights lose their defen-
sive nature. Seeking enhanced protection against dilution, the brand owner
asks for control over the use of the trademark across all markets and regard-
less of whether there is a likelihood of confusion. This brings anti-dilution
rights close to exploitation rights. However, unlike other intellectual property
owners enjoying exploitation rights, such as inventors and authors, the brand
owner cannot validly claim to have created intellectual property that furthers
science or art. The trademark does not even fall into the public domain after a
limited period of time. By contrast, brand protection is protection of invest-
ments that are made to improve an enterprise’s market position. It is not
evident that this selfish investment decision also furthers the overall welfare
of society.
Against this background, it is unclear why trademark law should offer
brand exploitation rights.21 Typical rationales underlying the grant of exploita-
tion rights in intellectual property law, such as the incentive rationale and the
reward rationale, are inapplicable in this context. It is not obvious that the
extra incentive of brand exploitation rights is needed to spur investment in
brand creation. In fact, there is little evidence of any need for brand image
creation in society that would justify the invocation of this rationale and an
extra incentive for brand image creators.22 By contrast, it may be argued that
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20 The result of these marketing efforts, however, is ‘self-dilution’. As the trade-
mark owner herself engages in the establishment of links with additional products, she
could hardly care less about the immediate association of the mark with a specific prod-
uct in the minds of consumers. Cf. S. Stadler Nelson (2003), ‘The Wages of Ubiquity
in Trademark Law’, Iowa Law Review, 88, 731.
21 For a detailed analysis of potential justifications, see W. Sakulin (2010),
Trademark Protection and Freedom of Expression – An Inquiry into the Conflict
between Trademark Rights and Freedom of Expression under European Law, The
Hague, London and New York: Kluwer Law International, pp. 35–67, who also casts
doubt upon the justificatory basis of protection against dilution. Proponents of brand
image protection in the framework of trademark law particularly point to the effort and
financial expenses made by the brand owner. For instance, see A. Breitschaft (2009),
‘Intel, Adidas & Co – Is the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice on Dilution
Law in Compliance with the Underlying Rationales and Fit for the Future?’, EIPR,
497, 499. Considering the costs for society involved in the grant of brand image protec-
tion – in particular restrictions of freedom of expression and freedom of competition –
this fact alone, however, can hardly be deemed sufficient for the grant of broad exclu-
sive rights.
22 See D. Scott, A. Oliver and M. Ley-Pineda, ‘Trade Marks as Property: a
seductive lifestyle messages conveyed by a trademark distract from a prod-
uct’s genuine qualities, thereby rendering consumers’ buying decisions less
objective and depriving the trader with the objectively best offer of corre-
sponding market success.23 Potential economic arguments, such as the facili-
tation of competition in mature markets and the enhancement of product
popularity, are outweighed by social and cultural concerns about the privati-
zation of words and phrases.24
The reward argument hardly offers stronger support.25 Admittedly, it is
the trademark owner who spent time and money on the creation of a partic-
ular brand image. Feelings of rightness and justice, therefore, suggest that
the result of these efforts be due to her. Comparing brand image with other
intellectual creations, however, it becomes doubtful whether the trademark
owner deserves this reward. Whereas works and inventions contribute to
mankind’s treasury of cultural expression and technical knowledge once
they fall into the public domain, a trademark carrying a particular brand
image can be monopolized ad infinitum by the trademark owner by
constantly renewing registration. As emphasized above, the investment in
the creation of a brand image remains an individual, selfish marketing deci-
sion for which the trademark owner cannot necessarily expect a reward from
society as a whole.26
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Philosophical Perspective’, in Bently, Davis and Ginsburg, supra note 3, pp. 285,
296–7, who consider product differentiation, facilitation of consumer choice and incen-
tives to purchasing and, nevertheless, reject utilitarian arguments. Cf. M.A. Lemley
(1999), ‘The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense’, Yale Law Journal
108, 1687, 1694–6); R.S. Brown (1999), ‘Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal
Protection of Trade Symbols’, Yale Law Journal, 108, 1619, 1622–34.
23 See Brown, ibid, 1635–7, who points out that ‘[t]he classical economists who
enthroned the consumer never dreamed that he would make his decisions under a
bombardment of stupefying symbols.’ However, see also the economic analysis
conducted by R. van den Bergh and M. Lehmann (1992), ‘Informationsökonomie und
Verbraucherschutz im Wettbewerbs- und Warenzeichenrecht’, Gewerblicher
Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht International, 588, 589–93).
24 See Strasser, supra note 3, 389–90 and 412–14, on the one hand, and Lemley,
supra note 22, 1694–8; R. Cooper Dreyfuss (1996), ‘We Are Symbols and Inhabit
Symbols, so should we be Paying Rent? Deconstructing the Lanham Act and Rights of
Publicity’, Columbia-VLA Journal of Law & Arts, 20, 123, 128, on the other hand.
25 For an analysis of Lockean justification models, see Scott, Oliver and Ley-
Pineda, supra note 22, pp. 297–305; Sakulin, supra note 21, pp. 63–6.
26 Cf. B. Beebe (2006), ‘A Defense of the New Federal Trademark Antidilution
Law’, Fordham Intellectual Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal, 16, 1143,
1159, stating that a court ‘should not grant antidilution protection to reward – i.e., to
promote – spending on advertising, just as it should not grant such protection in recog-
nition of something like the plaintiff’s good faith in trying as hard as it can to make its
mark famous.’
With classical rationales being unavailable in the case of brand exploita-
tion rights, law and policy makers in the field of trademark law should be
cautious with regard to the extension of trademark protection beyond the tradi-
tional field of protection against confusion. Not surprisingly, the legal frame-
work set forth in the EU Trademark Directive includes several safeguards
against inappropriately broad protection in this area. For EU Member States,
the grant of enhanced protection against dilution is optional under Art. 5(2)
TMD. If the provision is implemented into national law,27 the brand owner
still has to surmount several hurdles to obtain protection. Besides the obliga-
tion to satisfy the general protection requirements of use in the course of trade
and use in relation to goods or services, the brand owner must show that her
trademark has a reputation, and that a conflicting sign is used in a way that
takes unfair advantage of, or is detrimental to, the distinctive character or the
repute of the trademark. Moreover, Art. 5(2) TMD provides for a flexible
defence of ‘due cause’ to counterbalance the grant of anti-dilution protection.
With these safeguards, the EU trademark system seems unlikely to
succumb to the temptation of granting unjustified brand exploitation rights.
The phalanx of infringement criteria clearly indicates that the mere use of a
sign similar to a mark with a reputation is not intended to give rise to an
infringement action based on dilution. Anti-dilution protection should not
readily be awarded whenever a sign calling to mind a mark with a reputation
is used in some area of the market. Otherwise, the brand owner would obtain
an exclusive right that, de facto, can be equated with exploitation rights
conferred in copyright and patent law. Instead, the conditions laid down in Art.
5(2) TMD call upon courts in the EU to embark on a careful case-by-case
analysis to ascertain whether the individual circumstances of the case brought
before them justify anti-dilution protection.28
3. EXCESSES
The CJEU, however, is reluctant to follow this cautious approach. Instead of
seeking to give individual meaning to the various protection requirements, the
Court seems determined to systematically lower the threshold for anti-dilution
protection and cut up the safety net of infringement criteria that was tied to
prevent overbroad brand image protection. Step by step, the Court has relaxed
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27 In fact, all EU Member States implemented Art. 5(2) TMD in their national
trademark laws. On the basis of this provision, anti-dilution protection is thus available
throughout the European Union.
28 For a more detailed discussion of an approach avoiding an unjustified protec-
tion automatism in EU trademark law, see Senftleben, supra note 4, 59–64.
the applicable protection requirements in recent years.29 As a result, anti-dilu-
tion rights in the EU come closer and closer to unjustified brand exploitation
rights. Brand owners may soon be able to invoke anti-dilution protection to
control any use of signs similar to a mark with a reputation in trade.
Under the aegis of the CJEU, the general protection requirements of use in
the course of trade30 and use in relation to goods or services do not constitute
substantial hurdles for trademark owners seeking protection. In particular, the
requirement of use in relation to goods or services is applied flexibly by the
CJEU.31 In principle, this general prerequisite for protection could be under-
stood to require ‘use as a trademark’. It may be applied to confine the scope
of trademark rights to instances where another’s trademark is employed as an
identifier of commercial source with regard to one’s own goods or services.32
Following this approach, access to trademark protection could be contained
from the outset.33 The entrance requirement of trademark use would already
serve as a filter to exclude claims that are unrelated to the identification and
distinction of goods and services. Nonetheless, this notion of trademark use
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29 In particular, see CJEU, 14 September 1999, case C-375/97, General Motors
v Yplon (‘Chevy’); 23 October 2003, case C-408/01, Adidas/Fitnessworld; 18 June
2009, case C-487/07, L’Oréal/Bellure.
30 Use of a trademark constitutes use in the course of trade in the EU where it
occurs ‘in the context of commercial activity with a view to economic advantage and
not as a private matter.’ See CJEU, 23 March 2010, cases C-236/08-238/08,
Google/Louis Vuitton et al., para. 50; CJEU, 12 November 2002, case C-206/01,
Arsenal/Reed, para. 40.
31 For an overview of developments in this area, see A. Kur (2008), ‘Confusion
Over Use? Die Benutzung “als Marke” im Lichte der EuGH-Rechtsprechung’,
Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht International, 1, 11.
32 CJEU, 25 January 2007, case C-48/05, Opel/Autec, para. 24, pointed in this
direction. The course adopted in this judgment, however, was not followed in further
decisions. Cf. P.J. Yap (2009), ‘Essential Function of a Trade Mark: From BMW to
O2’, EIPR, 81, 86–7.
33 With regard to similar proposals in the US, see S.L. Dogan and M.A. Lemley
(2008), ‘The Trademark Use Requirement in Dilution Cases’, Santa Clara Computer
& High Technology Law Journal, 24, 541, 542: ‘By maintaining the law’s focus on
misleading branding, the trademark use doctrine keeps trademark law true to its ulti-
mate goal of promoting competitive markets.’ However, see also G.B. Dinwoodie and
M.D. Janis (2007), ‘Confusion Over Use: Contextualism in Trademark Law’, Iowa
Law Review, 92, 1597, 1657–8, doubting that problems arising in the current ‘expan-
sionist climate’ could be solved by recalibrating the notion of trademark use:
‘Trademark use is simply too blunt a concept, no matter how defined, to capture the full
range of values at play in these debates.’ For a summary of the debate, see M. Davison
and F. Di Giantomasso (2009), ‘Use as a Trade Mark: Avoiding Confusion When
Considering Dilution’, EIPR, 443. With regard to the EU, see Kur, supra note 31, who
warns of limiting trademark protection from the outset on the basis of a restrictive
notion of trademark use, in particular with regard to Community trademarks.
would cover instances of dilution where harm to a mark with a reputation
flows from a conflicting sign used by a third party as a source identifier. In the
1975 landmark Claeryn/Klarein decision of the Benelux Court of Justice – an
important source for the later harmonized EU anti-dilution regime – use of the
sign KLAREIN as a source identifier for a cleaning detergent gave rise to an
infringement action based on dilution because it was similar to the well-known
gin trademark CLAERYN and encroached upon that trademark’s ‘potential for
raising a desire to buy’.34
Instead of sharpening the conceptual contours of trademark use in this way,
the CJEU has constantly weakened this general protection requirement. The
Court found use for the purpose of informing the public about repair and main-
tenance services offered with regard to trademarked products to constitute rele-
vant trademark use.35 The CJEU also qualified use in comparative advertising
as trademark use on the grounds that the advertiser made use of a competitor’s
trademark to distinguish her own products from those of the competitor.36
Summarizing the notion of trademark use, the Court held that for satisfying the
requirement of trademark use, it was sufficient that a link was established with
the trademark.37 As a result, the basic requirement of trademark use does not
prevent trademark owners from asserting their rights against references to the
trademark even though the public does not perceive these references as an indi-
cation of commercial source. By contrast, referential use is brought within the
reach of the exclusive rights of trademark owners.
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34 See Benelux Court of Justice, 1 March 1975, case A74/1, Claeryn/Klarein,
published in Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1975, 472; Ars Aequi 1977, 664; Bijblad bij
de Industriële Eigendom 1975, 183. Cf. Casparie-Kerdel, supra note 15, 189–90. See
also Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, 10 July 2003, concerning CJEU, case C-
408/01, Adidas/Fitnessworld, para. 38, stating that ‘the concept of detriment to the
repute of a trade mark […] describes the situation where – as it was put in the well-
known Claeryn/Klarein decision of the Benelux Court of Justice – the goods for which
the infringing sign is used appeal to the public’s senses in such a way that the trade
mark’s power of attraction is affected.’
35 See CJEU, 23 February 1999, case C-63/97, BMW/Deenik, para. 42. For an
overview of the development of the trademark use requirement in CJEU jurisprudence,
see Kur, supra note 31.
36 See CJEU, 12 June 2008, case C-533/06, O2/Hutchison, paras 35–6. As to
keyword advertising on the basis of services offered by a search engine, use of a
competitor’s trademark as a keyword for a sponsored link with one’s own advertising
has been found to constitute trademark use on similar grounds. See CJEU, 23 March
2010, cases C-236/08-238/08, Google/Louis Vuitton et al., para. 71.
37 See CJEU, 19 February 2009, case C-62/08, UDV/Brandtraders, para. 47.
The emphasis on the criterion of a mere link with the goods or services offered under
a conflicting sign was particularly confirmed in cases dealing with keyword advertis-
ing. See CJEU, 23 March 2010, cases C-236/08-238/08, Google/Louis Vuitton et al.,
para. 72; 12 July 2011, case C-324/09, L’Oréal/eBay, para. 92.
In the case of marks with a reputation, even decorative use that merely
calls to mind the protected trademark may be held to constitute relevant trade-
mark use on the basis of CJEU jurisprudence. The case ‘Lila Postkarte’ of the
German Federal Court of Justice, for instance, concerned the marketing of
postcards that alluded ironically to trademarks and advertising campaigns of
the chocolate producer Milka. On purple background corresponding to
Milka’s abstract colour mark, the postcard sought to ridicule the nature idyll
with cows and mountains that is evoked in Milka advertising. It showed the
following poem attributed to ‘Rainer Maria Milka’:
Über allen Wipfeln ist Ruh,
irgendwo blökt eine Kuh.
Muh!38
Assessing this ironic play with Milka insignia, the German Federal Court of
Justice confirmed the broad notion of trademark use following from the
jurisprudence of the CJEU.39 It held that for the use of Milka trademarks to
constitute trademark use in the sense of Art. 5(2) TMD, it was sufficient that
the postcard called to mind the well-known Milka signs.40 In spite of being
decorative, the use in question therefore gave rise to the question of trademark
infringement. Accordingly, the German Federal Court of Justice embarked on
a scrutiny of the trademark parody in the light of the infringement criteria of
detriment to distinctive character or repute, and the taking of unfair advantage.
Weighing Milka’s concerns about a disparagement of the trademarks against
the fundamental guarantee of the freedom of art, the Court finally concluded
that the freedom of art had to prevail in light of the ironic statement made with
the postcard.41 The use of Milka trademarks was found to have taken place
with ‘due cause’ in the sense of Art. 5(2) TMD.42
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38 ‘It is calm above the tree tops, somewhere a cow is bellowing. Moo!’ The
attribution to ‘Rainer Maria Milka’ is an allusion to the famous German writer Rainer
Maria Rilke. See German Federal Court of Justice, 3 February 2005, case I ZR 159/02,
Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht 2005, 583, Lila Postkarte, online avail-
able at www.bundesgerichtshof.de. Cf. C. Born (2006), ‘Zur Zulässigkeit einer humor-
vollen Markenparodie – Anmerkungen zum Urteil des BGH “Lila Postkarte”’,
Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht, 192.
39 See the reference to CJEU, 23 October 2003, case C-408/01,
Adidas/Fitnessworld, para. 39, in the decision Lila Postkarte of the German Federal
Court of Justice, supra note 38, 584. With regard to the qualification of decorative use
as relevant trademark use, see also Kur, supra note 31, 5–6.
40 See German Federal Court of Justice, supra note 38, 584.
41 See German Federal Court of Justice, supra note 38, 584–5. For a further case
in which freedom of speech prevailed over trademark protection, see German Federal
Court of Justice, 11 March 2008, case VI ZR 7/07, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift
2008, 2110, Gen-Milch, online available at www.bundesgerichtshof.de.
42 German Federal Court of Justice, supra note 38, 585.
Examples of this kind show that, with jurisprudence encouraging the inclu-
sion of referential and decorative use in an elastic concept of trademark use,
the CJEU has opened the doors wide to trademark protection.43 Trademark
rights become generally available when a protected sign is used in the context
of presenting or discussing goods or services. This general control over
communication involving a trademark paves the way for the extension of
trademark rights to exploitation rights comparable to those conferred in copy-
right and patent law. The mere use of a trademark in some relation to goods or
services is sufficient to lodge an infringement claim.44 In the Milka case, for
instance, the infringement action could not be stopped at an early stage by
holding that the use did not constitute actionable trademark use. Instead, the
parodist had to invoke the defence of due cause and argue the case in several
instances until the German Federal Court of Justice took a final decision.
Admittedly, the CJEU need not necessarily employ the basic requirement
of use in relation to goods or services as a means to draw clear boundary lines
of trademark protection in the EU. The general requirement of trademark use
is followed by several more specific conditions. As indicated above, a brand
owner seeking protection under Art. 5(2) TMD must also show that her trade-
mark has a reputation. This further protection requirement only applies in the
specific context of anti-dilution protection. Therefore, it could be embraced by
the CJEU as a tool to regulate access to this problematic enhanced layer of
protection. With a nuanced concept of reputation, the Court could ensure that
anti-dilution protection is awarded only if a trademark has a brand image that
is likely to be harmed or unfairly exploited because of its particular value and
attractiveness. The requirement of ‘having a reputation’ could become an
important eligibility criterion in the case of brand owners seeking protection
against dilution.
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43 The requirement of trademark use is even less relevant in EU Member States
that, in line with Art. 5(5) TMD extend trademark protection to forms of use ‘other than
for the purposes of distinguishing goods or services’. In these Member States, not only
the requirement of ‘use in the course of trade’ but also the requirement of ‘use in rela-
tion to goods or services’ does not apply in this area of extended protection. See Art.
2.20(1)(d) of the Benelux Treaty Concerning Intellectual Property. Cf. T. Cohen
Jehoram, C.J.J.C. van Nispen and J.L.R.A. Huydecoper (2008), Industriële eigendom
– Deel 2: Merkenrecht, Deventer: Kluwer, 366–7; C. Gielen (2007), ‘Merkenrecht’, in
C. Gielen (ed.), Kort begrip van het intellectuele eigendomsrecht, Deventer: Kluwer,
pp. 256 and 286–7.
44 This risk of creating an automatism of property claims (‘Eigentumslogik’) is
also pointed out by proponents of an elastic notion of trademark use. See Kur, supra
note 31, 12. For similar concerns expressed against the background of developments in
the US, see S.L. Dogan and M.A. Lemley (2008), ‘Grounding Trademark Law Through
Trademark Use’, Trademark Reporter, 98, 1345.
Instead of establishing an appropriate test that regulates eligibility for anti-
dilution protection, the threshold for assuming that a trademark has the neces-
sary reputation is remarkably low in the EU. In Chevy, the Court explained
that ‘the market share held by the trade mark’ and ‘the size of the investment
made by the undertaking in promoting it’ had to be taken into account in this
context.45 However, the Court also explained that:
[t]he public amongst which the earlier trade mark must have acquired a reputation
is that concerned by that trade mark, that is to say, depending on the product or
service marketed, either the public at large or a more specialized public, for exam-
ple traders in a specific sector.46
Moreover, the Court clarified that:
[t]he degree of knowledge required must be considered to be reached when the
earlier mark is known by a significant part of the public concerned by the products
or services covered by that trade mark.47
This clarification shows that the Court considers knowledge among the indi-
vidual target group of the product concerned sufficient, even though this target
group may be a specialized public in the case of specific products or services.
The Court favours a niche reputation approach. Further findings in Chevy
confirm this conclusion. In respect of the necessary territorial expansion of the
mark’s reputation, the Court held the view that:
[i]n the absence of any definition [in Art. 5(2) TMD] in this respect, a trade mark
cannot be required to have a reputation ‘throughout’ the territory of the Member
State. It is sufficient for it to exist in a substantial part of it.48
Hence, the CJEU follows a niche reputation approach focusing on knowledge
among a significant part of a potentially specialized public in a substantial part
of an EU Member State. Introducing this low standard, the Court is far from
exerting efficient access control on the basis of the reputation requirement.
Instead of actively regulating access to enhanced protection against dilution,
the door to anti-dilution rights is kept wide open.49 Not only the general
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45 See CJEU, 14 September 1999, case C-375/97, General Motors v Yplon
(‘Chevy’), para. 27.
46 CJEU, ibid, para. 24.
47 CJEU, ibid, para. 26.
48 CJEU, ibid, para. 28. In respect of the territorial expansion required in the
case of Community trademarks, see CJEU, 6 October 2009, case C-301/07,
Pago/Tirolmilch, paras 29–30.
49 Cf. the critique by F. Pollaud-Dulian (2001), ‘Marques de renommée: Histoire
de la dénaturation d’un concept’, Propriétés intellectuelles, 43.
requirement of trademark use but also the specific eligibility criterion of
‘having a reputation’ is virtually eroded instead of being employed to keep
trademark protection within reasonable limits.
The erosion of a further prerequisite for protection seems inevitable in the
context of anti-dilution protection. As pointed out above, traditional protection
against confusion requires some likelihood of confusion. Protection against
dilution, however, is not primarily concerned with the prevention of confusing
use. It aims at preserving the particular distinctive character and the repute of
marks with a reputation. A trademark’s particular distinctive character or
repute, however, may be harmed or unfairly exploited without causing a risk
of confusion. The mere allusion to the mark with a reputation can be sufficient.
Accordingly, the CJEU adopted an elastic association test in Adidas/
Fitnessworld. In line with this ruling, enhanced protection against dilution
becomes available when a competing sign calls to mind a mark with a reputa-
tion.50
After this erosion of safeguards against overbroad brand image protection,
the seemingly robust edifice of EU infringement criteria is about to crumble.
To obtain protection against dilution, however, the brand owner still must
provide evidence that the conflicting use takes unfair advantage of, or is detri-
mental to, the distinctive character or the repute of the mark with a reputation.
This remaining condition constitutes the last bastion against overbroad brand
image exploitation rights. Against this background, the decision Intel/CPM
gave hope that the CJEU would defend at least this remaining barrier. With
regard to proof of detriment to the distinctive character of a mark with a repu-
tation, the Court required:
evidence of a change in the economic behaviour of the average consumer of the goods
or services for which the earlier mark was registered consequent on the use of the later
mark, or a serious likelihood that such a change will occur in the future.51
From a practical perspective, one may wonder how the required ‘evidence of a
change in the economic behaviour of the average consumer’ can ever be
produced.52 Considering the need to balance protection, however, it is consistent
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50 See CJEU, 23 October, 2003, case C-408/01, Adidas/Fitnessworld, para. 29.
51 See CJEU, 27 November 2008, case C-252/07, Intel/CPM, para. 77.
52 Cf. A. Bouvel, ‘Marques et renommée: À propos de l’arrêt “Intel” rendu par
la Cour de justice des communautés européennes le 27 novembre 2008 (aff. C-
252/07)’, in Geiger and Schmidt-Szalewski, supra note 18, p. 123; A.A. Quaedvlieg
(2009), ‘INTEL en verwatering: Economisch gedrag en juridisch bewijs’, Bijblad bij
de industriële eigendom., 253; A.A. Quaedvlieg (2009), ‘Herkomst- en goodwill-
inbreuk in het merkenrecht na INTEL en l’Oréal’, Ars Aequi, 799; S. Middlemiss and
S. Warner (2009), ‘The Protection of Marks with a Reputation: Intel v CPM’, EIPR,
326, 331–2.
to pose a difficult hurdle. With the general requirement of trademark use and
the specific eligibility criterion of having a reputation being rendered mean-
ingless, it is justified to set a high threshold when it comes to the final ques-
tion of taking unfair advantage or causing detriment.
The Intel/CPM decision, however, was followed by the L’Oréal/Bellure
judgment in which the CJEU lowered this final threshold substantially.
Dealing with comparison lists concerning cheap imitations of well-known
L’Oréal perfumes, the Court stated that a mere attempt to ride on the coat-tails
of a mark with a reputation could be sufficient to assume that unfair advantage
had been taken. It explained that
where a third party attempts, through the use of a sign similar to a mark with a repu-
tation, to ride on the coat-tails of that mark in order to benefit from its power of
attraction, its reputation and its prestige, and to exploit, without paying any finan-
cial compensation and without being required to make efforts of his own in that
regard, the marketing effort expended by the proprietor of that mark in order to
create and maintain the image of that mark, the advantage resulting from such use
must be considered to be an advantage that has been unfairly taken of the distinc-
tive character or the repute of that mark.53
The fundamental change with regard to the availability of anti-dilution protec-
tion becomes apparent the moment the relationship between the different final
infringement criteria is considered. The three modes of infringement – detri-
ment to distinctive character (blurring), detriment to repute (tarnishment),
unfair advantage from distinctive character or repute (free-riding) – constitute
alternative conditions in accordance with Art. 5(2) TMD. By setting a low
standard for the taking of unfair advantage, the Court thus creates a loophole
that can be used when a showing of detriment is impossible. The brand owner
who does not succeed in providing ‘evidence of a change in the economic
behaviour of the average consumer’ can insist on the taking of unfair advan-
tage instead. For this alternative basis of her claim, she merely has to argue
that the defendant attempts (!) to ride on the coat-tails of the mark with a repu-
tation.
With the creation of the coat-tail formula in L’Oréal/Bellure, the CJEU,
therefore, abandoned the remaining bastion of final infringement criteria.
Under Art. 5(2) TMD, brand owners seeking anti-dilution protection can bene-
fit from an elastic entrance requirement of trademark use, encompassing refer-
ential and decorative use, a remarkably low eligibility criterion of having a
reputation, an elastic association test of calling to mind the mark with a repu-
tation and, finally, a flexible unfair advantage criterion that is already fulfilled
152 Constructing European intellectual property
53 See CJEU, 18 June 2009, case C-487/07, L’Oréal/Bellure, para. 49.
the moment a third party attempts to ride on the coat-tails of the mark with a
reputation. Surveying these broad, elastic, and flexible conditions for protec-
tion against dilution, one can hardly deny that anti-dilution protection under
Art. 5(2) TMD requires little more than showing that a conflicting sign in
some area of the market triggers an association with a mark with a reputa-
tion.54 The CJEU, therefore, has brought anti-dilution rights very close to the
exploitation rights offered in copyright and patent law.
In L’Oréal/Bellure, however, the Court did not content itself with this
remarkable step in respect of Art. 5(2) TMD. It also transformed Art. 5(1)(a)
TMD into a powerful instrument for brand image protection. The provision
regulates protection in cases of double identity – a sign identical to the
protected trademark used for identical goods or services. In this regard, the
CJEU held that, besides the essential origin function, a trademark’s quality,
communication, investment, and advertising functions enjoy absolute protec-
tion under Art. 5(1)(a) TMD.55 These functions, however, are typically
fulfilled by marks with a reputation. As elaborated above, a strong brand is
capable of conveying lifestyle messages that are the result of substantial
investment in advertising. Protection of a trademark’s communication, invest-
ment, and advertising functions is thus protection of the investment in the
creation of a favourable brand image and the brand communication based on
this image.
In line with Recital 11 of the EU Trademark Directive, the CJEU assumes
that the protection of these additional trademark functions under Art. 5(1)(a)
TMD must be absolute. Indeed, the Recital stipulates that: 
[t]he protection afforded by the registered trade mark, the function of which is in
particular to guarantee the trade mark as an indication of origin, should be absolute
in the case of identity between the mark and the sign and the goods or services.
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54 However, see also the practical considerations by C. Morcom (2009),
‘L’Oréal v Bellure – Who Has Won?’, EIPR, 627, 634–5: ‘The law reports include
many cases which demonstrate that whatever the ECJ may rule, it may be dangerous to
assume that a mark is so well-known that little evidence is needed in claims invoking
art. 5(2) of the Trade Marks Directive and corresponding provisions elsewhere. Perhaps
Intel provides an example.’ Nonetheless, the crucial point here is that the CJEU
lowered the conditions for a showing of infringement under Art. 5(2) TMD substan-
tially by providing the coat-tail formula as a vehicle to bypass the higher infringement
standard developed in Intel. The practical difficulties with regard to sufficient evidence,
therefore, have been reduced significantly.
55 CJEU, supra note 53, para. 58. Cf. F. Hacker (2009), ‘Funktionenlehre und
Benutzungsbegriff nach ‘L’Oréal’, Markenrecht, 333.
However, this Recital must be seen in the context of the Directive’s particular
structure. The drafters intended protection against confusion under Art. 5(1)
TMD to be mandatory, whereas protection against dilution under Art. 5(2)
TMD remained optional. The statement about absolute protection in double
identity cases falling under Art. 5(1)(a) TMD, therefore, only concerns manda-
tory protection against confusion. Including typical functions of marks with a
reputation in this system of absolute protection, the Court crossed this bound-
ary line drawn in the Directive. As protection of marks with a reputation is
optional under Art. 5(2) TMD, the protection of specific functions of these
trademarks also remains optional. The protection of the specific functions of
marks with a reputation under the mandatory Art. 5(1)(a) TMD encroaches
upon the freedom left to EU Member States.
The contra legem inclusion of communication, investment, and advertis-
ing functions in Art. 5(1)(a) TMD is a further step in the transformation of
trademark rights into brand exploitation instruments. According to the Court,
absolute protection under Art. 5(1)(a) TMD merely requires that one of the
protected functions of a trademark is ‘adversely’ affected by the use of an
identical sign for identical goods or services.56 It remains to be seen how the
Court further develops this criterion of adverse effect.57 Considering the
continuous relaxation of infringement criteria in the field of Art. 5(2) TMD, it
cannot be excluded that the threshold for a showing of adverse effect is fairly
low.58
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56 With regard to the requirement of adverse effect, see the explications given in
CJEU, 23 March 2010, cases C-236/08-238/08, Google France and Google/Louis
Vuitton et al., paras. 75–9.
57 It is doubtful whether the breathing space created in this way is sufficient to
satisfy freedom of speech concerns. See A. Ohly (2009), ‘Keyword-Advertising auf
dem Weg von Karlsruhe nach Luxemburg’, Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und
Urheberrecht, 709, 711–12; A. Kur, L. Bently and A. Ohly, ‘Sweet Smells and a Sour
Taste – the ECJ’s L’Oréal Decision’, Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property and
Competition Law Research Paper Series No. 09-12, online available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1492032.
58 However, in CJEU, 22 September 2011, case C-323/09, Interflora/Marks &
Spencer, the Court pointed out that the advertising function would not be adversely
affected simply because the trademark owner, as a result of keyword advertising, would
have to intensify its own advertising to maintain or enhance its profile with consumers
(para. 57). Similarly, the Court held that the investment function would not be
adversely affected by keyword advertising simply because the trademark owner was
obliged to adapt its efforts to acquire or preserve a reputation capable of attracting
consumers and retaining their loyalty (para. 64). These statements may be seen as an
indication that the Court, in any case, is prepared to preserve some freedom of compe-
tition in the area of advertising.
An elastic test of adverse effect, however, would be even more problem-
atic than a low threshold for anti-dilution protection under Art. 5(2) TMD.
As indicated above, a flexible defence of ‘due cause’ is available under Art.
5(2) TMD to safeguard comparative advertising and parody. A similar
balancing tool is sought in vain in Art. 5(1)(a) TMD.59 Comparative adver-
tising and parody almost inevitably interfere with brand communication,
investment, and advertising. A biting parody impacts deeply on the way in
which consumers perceive the target trademark. It is likely to have a corro-
sive effect on a favourable trademark image that is the result of substantial
investment in advertising and product control.60 Harm to the investment and
advertising function of a trademark can also flow from comparative adver-
tising that sheds new light on a trademark by informing consumers about
better offers in the marketplace. As the product comparison interferes with
the trademark communication initiated by the owner, affects prior invest-
ment in a favourable trademark image, and reduces the trademark’s adver-
tising power, it is difficult to see how advertisers could escape a finding of
adverse effect under Art. 5(1)(a) TMD. The verdict of infringement seems
unavoidable.61
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59 See the critique by A. Ohly (2010), ‘Keyword Advertising auf dem Weg
zurück von Luxemburg nach Paris, Wien, Karlsruhe und Den Haag’, Gewerblicher
Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht, 776, 780 and 782; Hacker, supra note 55, 337. Cf. also
Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property and Competition Law (2011), Study on
the Overall Functioning of the European Trade Mark System, Munich: Max Planck
Institute, online available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/indprop/tm/
index_en.htm, para. 2.260, stating that the present state of law is unsatisfactory because
of absolute protection ‘in the sense that it does not depend on any balancing of inter-
ests, apart from a functional analysis.’
60 T-shirts or cartoons parodying the trademarked Mickey Mouse drawing can
serve as an example of a parody falling under Art. 5(1)(a) TMD. See the international
Madrid registration no. 296478 of Mickey Mouse relating, among various other prod-
ucts, to printed matter (class 16) and clothing (class 25). The particulars of the regis-
tration can be consulted online at <http://www.wipo.int/ipdl/en/madrid/
search-struct.jsp>. In the copyright fair use case Campbell v Acuff Rose, the US
Supreme Court solved the problem by stating that ‘when a lethal parody, like a scathing
theater review, kills demand for the original, it does not produce a harm cognizable
under the Copyright Act.’ See Campbell v Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. 569 (1994), II D. A
similar denial of ‘adverse effect’ by the CJEU would be necessary to safeguard parody
under Art. 5(1)(a) TMD.
61 However, the indications given by the Court in Interflora/Marks & Spencer,
as explained supra note 58, must be considered in this context. Nonetheless, the mere
presumption of confusion in double identity cases would offer more flexibility. In cases
of comparative advertising meeting the requirements stated in the EC Comparative
Advertisement Directive, it could be concluded that the presumption has been rebutted.
In L’Oréal/Bellure, the CJEU solved this dilemma by invoking the rules of
the EC Comparative Advertisement Directive.62 Using the criteria for permis-
sible comparative advertising as an external balancing tool, the Court arrived
at the conclusion that a case of infringement would only arise where a trade-
mark was used for the purpose of comparative advertising without all the
requirements stated in the Comparative Advertisement Directive being satis-
fied.63 To add flexibility to its overbroad system of trademark function protec-
tion under Art. 5(1)(a) TMD, the Court thus had to resort to the rules on
comparative advertising outside the Trademark Directive. Whether the Court
will make similar efforts for parodists remains to be seen. In any case, the
developments in the area of Art. 5(1)(a) TMD confirm the Court’s intention to
give brand owners rather general control over any communication involving
their marks with a reputation. Besides flexible anti-dilution protection under
Art. 5(2) TMD, they can rely on protection under Art. 5(1)(a) TMD that only
requires a showing of adverse effect on brand communication, investment, and
advertising.
4. NEW TECHNOLOGIES
After this excessive broadening of brand protection, it is an open question how
the CJEU will adapt trademark law to new technologies. The Internet, bring-
ing along the challenge of keyword advertising, may have a mitigating effect
on the further development of trademark protection in the EU. In particular, it
allows the CJEU to reconsider the balance between trademark protection and
fundamental freedoms, such as freedom of expression and freedom of compe-
tition.64 It is obvious that the extension of trademark rights in recent years
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62 The Court dealt with the Misleading Advertisement Directive 84/450 of 10
September 1984, as amended by the Comparative Advertisement Directive 97/55 of 6
October 1997. These two Directives are now consolidated in the Misleading and
Comparative Advertisement Directive 2006/114/EC of 12 December 2006.
63 See CJEU, 18 June 2009, case C-487/07, L’Oréal/Bellure, paras 54 and 65.
64 With regard to the mitigating effect of fundamental rights on intellectual prop-
erty protection regimes, see C. Geiger (2008), ‘The Constitutional Dimension of
Intellectual Property’, in L.C. Torremans (ed.), Intellectual Property and Human
Rights, The Hague, London and New York: Kluwer Law International, p. 101; L.R.
Helfer (2007), ‘Toward a Human Rights Framework for Intellectual Property’,
University of California, Davis Law Review, 40, 971, online available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=891303; T. Mylly (2005), ‘Intellectual Property and
Fundamental Rights: Do They Interoperate?’, in N. Bruun (ed.), Intellectual Property
Beyond Rights, Helsinki: WSOY, p. 185; C. Geiger (2004), ‘Fundamental Rights, a
Safeguard for the Coherence of Intellectual Property?’, IIC, 35, 268.
endangers artistic and commercial freedom of expression and information.65
As explained above, the Court included referential and decorative trademark
use in its flexible concept of trademark use. As a result, trademark rights can
be asserted against mere references to a protected sign even though these refer-
ences are not perceived as an indication of commercial origin by the public.
With this approach, references to trademarks in comparative advertising and
parody have become actionable under EU trademark law. Given the elastic
infringement tests applied by the Court in the context of Art. 5(2) and 5(1)(a)
TMD, they may easily amount to infringement. Under these circumstances,
sufficient breathing space for freedom of speech and freedom of competition
depends on appropriate defences that are scarce at least in the case of Art.
5(1)(a) TMD.
The Advocates General (AG) in keyword advertising cases openly address
this dilemma in opinions concerning trademark use in the digital environment.
The need to strike a proper balance between trademark protection and freedom
of expression and competition has become a recurring theme. In his opinion in
Google France, AG Poiares Maduro underlined the importance of appropriate
counterbalances in the light of broad brand protection:
Nevertheless, whatever the protection afforded to innovation and investment, it is
never absolute. It must always be balanced against other interests, in the same way
as trade mark protection itself is balanced against them. I believe that the present
cases call for such a balance as regards freedom of expression and freedom of
commerce.66
Similarly, AG Jääskinen urged the Court in his opinion in L’Oréal/eBay not
to forget: 
that the listings uploaded by users to eBay’s marketplace are communications
protected by the fundamental rights of freedom of expression and information
provided by Article 11 of [the] Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU and Article
10 of the European Convention on Human Rights.67
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65 With regard to the digital environment, cf. Dogan and Lemley, supra note 40,
1372–3. See also R. Tushnet (2008), ‘Gone in Sixty Milliseconds: Trademark Law and
Cognitive Science’, Texas Law Review, 86, 507, pointing out that even a minimalist
anti-dilution statute is likely to impact deeply on freedom of speech.
66 See AG Poiares Maduro, opinion of 22 September 2009, cases C-236/08-
238/08, Google France and Google/Louis Vuitton et al., para. 102.
67 See AG N. Jääskinen, opinion of 9 December 2010, case C-324/09,
L’Oréal/eBay, para. 49. For an overview of decisions concerning keyword advertising
by online auction providers, see A.S.Y. Cheung and K.K.H. Pun (2009), ‘Comparative
Study on the Liability for Trade Mark Infringement of Online Auction Providers’,
EIPR, 559.
In his further opinion in Interflora/Marks & Spencer, Jääskinen again invited
the Court to recalibrate the EU brand protection system in light of the need to
reconcile trademark protection with competing fundamental rights. The case
concerned an infringement action brought by Interflora on the grounds that
Marks & Spencer bought the well-known Interflora trademark and several
variants thereof as keywords for the advertising of its competing flower deliv-
ery service via the Google AdWords system. Addressing the coat-tail formula
developed in L’Oréal/Bellure with regard to Art. 5(2) TMD, Jääskinen
wondered why the Court did not make the existence of unfair advantage
dependent on the conflicting use being detrimental to the trademark proprietor.
In L’Oréal/Bellure, the CJEU had awarded protection against the taking of
unfair advantage even though the trademark owner had failed to demonstrate
the existence of any harm, such as an impairment of sales or a loss of reward
for the promotion and maintenance of the trademark.68 With regard to freedom
of competition, Jääskinen warns against this background of:
a move away from a Pareto optimal situation. The situation of the trade mark propri-
etor would not improve as he by definition would not suffer any detriment because
of the use, but the competitor’s situation would worsen because he would lose a part
of his business. Also the situation of the consumers who had not been misled by the
ad but consciously preferred to buy the competitor’s products would be impaired.69
Seeking to safeguard Marks & Spencer’s endeavours to present a commercial
alternative to Interflora flower delivery services, Jääskinen proposes not to
condemn the advertising simply because Marks & Spencer is taking advantage
of the repute of Interflora’s trademark, but to focus on the fairness of that use
instead. In Jääskinen’s view, the purpose of presenting a commercial alterna-
tive to the goods or services protected by a mark with a reputation should
count as due cause in the context of modern marketing relying on keyword
advertising on the Internet. Otherwise, keyword advertising using a third
party’s mark with a reputation would readily amount to prohibited free-riding.
Such a conclusion, however, could not be justified in view of the need to
promote undistorted competition and the possibilities of consumers seeking
information about goods and services.70
Although Marks & Spencer neither compares its goods and services with
those of Interflora, nor presents its goods as imitations or copies, or even
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68 See CJEU, 18 June 2009, case C-487/07, L’Oréal/Bellure, paras 30 and 43.
69 See AG N. Jääskinen, opinion of 24 March 2011, case C-323/09,
Interflora/Marks & Spencer, para. 94.
70 See Jääskinen, ibid, para. 99. The need to further develop the condition of
unfairness under Art. 5(2) TMD has also been pointed out by Kur, supra note 31, 6 and
10.
expressly presents them as alternatives, the importance attached to freedom of
competition and freedom of information prompts Jääskinen to conclude that
the mere choice of Interflora keywords in search engine advertising implies a
marketing message that Marks & Spencer offer an alternative service. Given
this implied message, the keyword advertising, according to Jääskinen, does
not constitute free-riding in the sense of the coat-tail formula developed by the
Court in L’Oréal/Bellure.71 Virtually, the Advocate General, therefore, calls
upon the Court to drop the infringement automatism created in
L’Oréal/Bellure and apply a strict test of unfairness instead. This proposal
could pave the way for a more balanced approach to Art. 5(2) TMD after the
continuous relaxation of infringement requirements in recent years.
In its judgment in Interflora/Marks & Spencer, the CJEU did not follow
this proposal to reconsider the elastic test of unfairness. Instead, the Court
confirmed the broad coat-tail formula developed in L’Oréal/Bellure. In the
view of the Court, an advertiser deriving benefits from a trademark with a
reputation by selecting that trademark as a keyword for its own advertising, in
principle, takes unfair advantage of the trademark with a reputation.72 The
Court added, however, that:
where the advertisement displayed on the internet on the basis of a keyword corre-
sponding to a trade mark with a reputation puts forward – without offering a mere
imitation of the goods or services of the proprietor of that trade mark, without caus-
ing dilution or tarnishment and without, moreover, adversely affecting the functions
of the trade mark concerned – an alternative to the goods or services of the propri-
etor of the trade mark with a reputation, it must be concluded that such use falls, as
a rule, within the ambit of fair competition in the sector for the goods or services
concerned and is thus not without ‘due cause’ for the purposes of Article 5(2).73
Instead of relaxing infringement criteria, the Court thus introduces a ‘due
cause’ defence covering the use of trademarks for the purpose of informing
Internet users of alternatives in the marketplace. In previous decisions, the
Court has already shown its willingness to offer breathing space for keyword
advertising services.74 In Google France and Google, the CJEU held that the
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71 See Jääskinen, supra note 70, paras 104–5.
72 See CJEU, 22 September 2011, case C-323/09, Interflora/Marks & Spencer,
paras 86–9.
73 CJEU, ibid, para. 91.
74 With regard to the development of jurisprudence concerning keyword adver-
tising in the EU, cf. Ohly, supra note 59; M.R.F. Senftleben (2010), ‘Keyword adver-
tising – Geldend Europees recht en daaruit volgende systematiek’, Bulletin industriële
eigendom, 346; J. Cornthwaite (2009), ‘AdWords or Bad Words? A UK Perspective on
Keywords and Trade Mark Infringement’, EIPR, 347; R. Knaak (2009), ‘Keyword
Advertising – Das aktuelle Key-Thema des Europäischen Markenrechts’,
search engine offering a keyword advertising service – in this case Google
with its AdWords service – did not use affected trademarks in the sense of
trademark law. It could not be inferred from the fact of creating the technical
conditions necessary for the use of a trademark as a keyword, and receiving a
payment for that keyword advertising service, that the search engine itself
used the sign.75 The Court confirmed this approach in L’Oréal/eBay by stat-
ing that the use of trademarks in offers for sale on the eBay platform did not
amount to use of those trademarks by eBay itself. Instead, the use was made
by eBay’s customers placing the respective offers on the website.76 Given the
flexible approach to trademark use in recent years, these rulings come as a
welcome surprise.77 They place keyword advertising services offered by
search engines beyond the direct control of trademark owners. Search engines
may be held liable, however, for infringing advertising made by the users of
the service, if they do not meet the requirements of the exemption for hosting
in Art. 14 of the EU E-Commerce Directive.78
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Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht International, 551; C. Well-Szönyi
(2009), ‘Adwords: Die Kontroverse um die Zulässigkeit der Verwendung fremder
Marken als Schlüsselwort in der französischen Rechtsprechung’, Gewerblicher
Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht International, 557; G. Engels (2009), ‘Keyword
Advertising – Zwischen beschreibender, unsichtbarer und missbräuchlicher
Verwendung’, Markenrecht, 289; M. Schubert and S. Ott (2009), ‘AdWords – Schutz
für die Werbefunktion einer Marke?’, Markenrecht, 338; O. Sosnitza (2009), ‘Adwords
= Metatags? Zur marken- und wettbewerbsrechtlichen Zulässigkeit des Keyword
Advertising über Suchmaschinen’, Markenrecht, 35; Ch. Gielen (2008), ‘Van adwords
en metatags’, in N.A.N.M. van Eijk et al. (eds.), Dommering-bundel, Amsterdam:
Cramwinckel, p. 101; O. van Daalen and A. Groen (2006), ‘Beïnvloeding van zoekre-
sultaten en gesponsorde koppelingen. De juridische kwalificatie van onzichtbaar
merkgebruik’, BMM Bulletin, 106.
75 See CJEU, 23 March 2010, cases C-236/08-238/08, Google France and
Google/Louis Vuitton et al., para. 57.
76 See CJEU, 12 July 2011, case C-324/09, L’Oréal/eBay, paras 101–5.
77 With regard to opposite developments in the US and a critique of these devel-
opments, see S.L. Dogan (2010), ‘Beyond Trademark Use’, Journal on
Telecommunication and High Technology Law, 8, 135. However, see also Dinwoodie
and Janis, supra note 33, 1629–32, warning of an information overload that may result
from widespread and unregulated sale of trademark-generated sponsored links.
78 CJEU, 23 March 2010, cases C-236/08-238/08, Google France and
Google/Louis Vuitton et al., para. 114. A more detailed discussion of the safe harbour for
hosting can be found in CJEU, 12 July 2011, case C-324/09, L’Oréal/eBay, paras 112–24,
where the Court establishes the standard of a ‘diligent economic operator’ (para. 120) to
be met by online intermediaries. As to the regulation of hosting service outside trademark
law, see also the fundamental critique expressed by G.B. Dinwoodie and M.D. Janis
(2007), ‘Lessons From the Trademark Use Debate’, Iowa Law Review, 92, 1703, 1717,
who point out in the light of developments in the US that ‘the sale of keyword-triggered
advertising and the manner of presentation of search results potentially create indepen-
dent trademark-related harm, thus making it an appropriate subject of direct liability.’
The Google France decision is also important with regard to the broad
function theory governing Art. 5(1)(a) TMD after L’Oréal/Bellure. Discussing
the liability of the advertiser using keyword advertising services, the Court
held that using another’s trademark as a keyword for one’s own advertising did
not encroach upon the advertising function of the affected trademark.79 The
CJEU comes to this conclusion by assuming that the website of the trademark
owner would feature prominently among the natural search results, and that
this prominent position would be sufficient to safeguard the advertising func-
tion.80 This doubtful assumption81 appears as a strategic argument to bypass
the new function theory altogether – at least with regard to the functions of
communication, investment, and advertising that are typically fulfilled by
marks with a reputation.82 The fact that the Court does not even address the
communication and investment function in Google France confirms this
impression. In the later L’Oréal/eBay decision, the Court also avoids a discus-
sion of the communication, investment and advertising functions in the
context of Art. 5(1)(a) TMD.83 In Interflora/Marks & Spencer, however, the
function theory features prominently again. The Court confirms the recogni-
tion of additional trademark functions under Art. 5(1)(a) TMD and devotes
particular attention to potential encroachments upon the advertising and
investment function.84
5. BACK TO BASICS?
In an ideal world, the steps taken by the CJEU in keyword advertising cases
would herald a fundamental change in the Court’s attitude towards brand
image protection. They would indicate that the Court is determined to bring
trademark protection back into shape after the excesses of recent years. With
a further sharpening of the conceptual contours of the notion of trademark
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becomes questionable in the case of ‘normal’ trademarks not having a particular repu-
tation. Webpages concerning these marks need not necessarily feature prominently
among the natural search results. The argument even becomes invalid if the trademark
owner does not have webpages.
82 With regard to the essential origin function that is traditionally protected
under Art. 5(1)(a) TMD, the Court did not hesitate to hold keyword advertising liable
of having an adverse effect. See CJEU, supra note 78, para. 90.
83 See CJEU, 12 July 2011, case C-324/09, L’Oréal/eBay, paras 94–7.
84 CJEU, 22 September 2011, case C-323/09, Interflora/Marks & Spencer, paras
37–40 and 56–64.
use,85 a high threshold for assuming an adverse effect on newly protected
trademark functions under Art. 5(1)(a) TMD, and a strict test of unfairness
under Art. 5(2) TMD in line with the Interflora opinion of AG Jääskinen, the
questionable protection of brand value would become subject to a careful
case-by-case analysis again. A protection automatism that brings trademark
rights close to exploitation rights could be avoided. Traditional protection
against confusion could be brought into focus again. The risk of encroach-
ments upon freedom of expression and freedom of competition could be
reduced.
For several reasons, however, this return to trademark protection of less
extravagant proportions is not very likely. First of all, it must not be over-
looked that the Google France decision need not be interpreted as a radical
departure from the expansionist course adopted by the Court in recent years.
Besides the outlined cautious approach to the notion of trademark use and the
protection of new trademark functions under Art. 5(1)(a) TMD, the decision
also contains elements that point towards a further strengthening of protection.
In particular, the CJEU imposed new obligations on advertisers with regard to
the prevention of consumer confusion. As to the essential origin function tradi-
tionally protected under Art. 5(1)(a) TMD, the Court stated:
In the case where the ad, while not suggesting the existence of an economic link, is
vague to such an extent on the origin of the goods or services at issue that normally
informed and reasonably attentive internet users are unable to determine, on the
basis of the advertising link and the commercial message attached thereto, whether
the advertiser is a third party vis-à-vis the proprietor of the trade mark or, on the
contrary, economically linked to that proprietor, the conclusion must also be that
there is an adverse effect on that function of the trade mark.86
In the almost simultaneous BergSpechte decision, the Court extended this
specific standard to Art. 5(1)(b) TMD.87 Both the origin function analysis
under Art. 5(1)(a) TMD and the likelihood of confusion test under Art. 5(1)(b)
TMD, therefore, now include the test whether the advertising is too vague to
exclude a potential risk of consumer confusion. This recalibration of protec-
tion against confusion is nothing less than a shift from proof of likely confu-
sion by the trademark owner to an obligation on all third parties to secure
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85 For an alternative concept focusing on contextual factors rather than the
‘wonder drug’ of trademark use as a limiting theory, see Dinwoodie and Janis, supra
note 33, 1657–61.
86 See CJEU, 23 March 2010, cases C-236/08-238/08, Google France and
Google/Louis Vuitton et al., para. 90.
87 See CJEU, 25 March 2010, case C-278/08, BergSpechte/Trekking.at, paras 36
and 38–40.
market transparency when using keyword advertising services.88 This change
seems to corroborate the Court’s efforts to overcome the rather defensive
nature of traditional trademark rights. Instead of conceiving of trademark
rights as instruments that shield trademarks from confusing use by third
parties at the initiative of the trademark owner, the Court redefines protection
against confusion as a positive obligation of third parties to keep a sufficient
distance from the origin information conveyed via the trademark. Google
France, therefore, does not necessarily put an end to the continuous broaden-
ing of trademark rights in recent years.
Moreover, it must not be overlooked that there are strong structural incen-
tives for the Court to apply at least the eligibility criteria laxly. In Art. 5 TMD,
for instance, a boundary line is drawn between use qualifying as trademark use
in the sense of EU trademark law and falling under the harmonized rules set
forth in Art. 5(1) to (4) TMD, and protection against use of a sign ‘other than
for the purposes of distinguishing goods or services’ that, in accordance with
Art. 5(5) TMD, remains unaffected by the Directive. The regulation of ‘other
use’ of this latter nature, therefore, is left to the discretion of EU Member
States. Apart from the Benelux countries that implemented Art. 5(5) TMD in
regional trademark legislation,89 this means that ‘other use’ is governed by the
various protection mechanisms against unfair competition in EU Member
States.90 Whenever the CJEU finds a particular form of trademark use not to
Adapting EU trademark law to new technologies 163
88 Cf. Ohly, supra note 59, 780; N. van de Laan (2010), ‘Die markenrechtliche
Lage des Keyword Advertising’, in J. Taeger (ed.), Digitale Evolution –
Herausforderungen für das Informations- und Medienrecht, Oldenburg: Oldenburger
Verlag für Wirtschaft, Informatik und Recht, p. 597 at p. 605), who refer to active infor-
mation obligations in unfair competition law. The practical consequences of this shift
must be clarified in further case law. From the perspective of the trademark owner, the
new formula may also be understood differently in the sense indicated in Max Planck
Institute, supra note 59, para. 2.171, that ‘the origin function would be adversely
affected (only) in the case where a third party’s ad suggests that there is an economic
link between that third party and the proprietor of the trade mark.’ For an overview of
recent national case law, see N. van der Laan, ‘The Use of Trade Marks in Keyword
Advertising: If Not Confusing, Yet Unfair?’, in N. Lee, G. Westkamp, A. Kur and A.
Ohly (eds), Property and Conduct: Convergences and Developments in Intellectual
Property, Unfair Competition and Publicity, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA:
Edward Elgar, forthcoming, chapter 11, section 5.
89 See Art. 2.20(1)(d) of the Benelux Treaty Concerning Intellectual Property.
Cf. Cohen Jehoram, van Nispen and Huydecoper, supra note 43, pp. 366–7; Gielen,
supra note 43, pp. 256 and 286–7.
90 With regard to the state of law against unfair competition in the EU and the
interplay between harmonized EU law and national regimes, see F. Henning-Bodewig
(2010), ‘Die Bekämpfung unlauteren Wettbewerbs in den EU-Mitgliedstaaten: eine
Bestandsaufnahme’, Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht International, 273;
F. Henning-Bodewig (2010), ‘Nationale Eigenständigkeit und europäische Vorgaben
constitute relevant trademark use, the Court thus foregoes the opportunity of
bringing that form of use under the umbrella of harmonized EU trademark law.
The exclusion of referential use from the notion of trademark use would
prevent the Court, for instance, from setting an EU-wide standard for the way
in which the public may be informed about repair and maintenance services
offered with regard to trademarked products.91 A less flexible concept of trade-
mark use, therefore, would reduce the level of harmonization which the Court
can attain on the basis of the Trademark Directive.92 Against this background,
the Court is unlikely to abandon the elastic interpretation of the notion of
trademark use developed in past cases.93 In Google France and L’Oréal/eBay,
the Court may have felt that, nonetheless, it was unnecessary to qualify
keyword advertising services provided by search engines or offers for sale
displayed by online marketplaces as relevant trademark use. At least formally,
the resulting harmonization vacuum could be filled by invoking the hosting
rules laid down in the E-Commerce Directive instead.94
In both cases, however, the Court still confirmed the flexibility of its trade-
mark use concept with regard to the use made by keyword advertisers them-
selves. In Google France, the Court recalled the general principle that relevant
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im Lauterkeitsrecht’, Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht International, 549;
R.M. Hilty and F. Henning-Bodewig (eds) (2009), Lauterkeitsrecht und Acquis
Communautaire, Berlin/Heidelberg: Springer; R.M. Hilty and F. Henning Bodewig
(eds) (2007), Law Against Unfair Competition – Towards a New Paradigm in Europe?,
Berlin/Heidelberg/New York: Springer.
91 Cf. CJEU, 23 February 1999, case C-63/97, BMW/Deenik, para. 42, which
concerned information on a car repair service specializing in BMW cars.
92 Cf. Kur, supra note 31, 11; P. Dyrberg and M. Skylv (2003), ‘Does Trade
Mark Infringement Require the Infringing Use be Trade Mark Use and if so, what is
“Trade Mark Use”?’, EIPR, 229, 232.
93 This may change with a change of the status of Art. 5(5) TMD in a mandatory
provision of harmonized EU trademark law. In this way, forms of other use could be
regulated by the CJEU without having to apply a broad notion of trademark use. See
Max Planck Institute, supra note 59, paras 2.221–2.222 and 2.229, with regard to this
solution. However, it seems that the adoption of Art. 5(5) TMD as a mandatory provi-
sion brings along the further expansion of trademark protection into fields that, so far,
may largely remain unaffected, such as the educational, scientific and cultural use.
94 These rules, however, are approached differently by the courts in EU Member
States. As a guideline, the CJEU held that, in order to invoke the safe harbour for host-
ing, the service provider had to be ‘neutral, in the sense that its conduct is merely tech-
nical, automatic and passive, pointing to a lack of knowledge or control of the data
which it stores.’ See CJEU, 23 March 2010, cases C-236/08-238/08, Google/Louis
Vuitton et al., paras 114–119. In CJEU, 12 July 2011, case C-324/09, L’Oréal/eBay,
para. 120, the Court also established the requirement to act as a ‘diligent economic
operator’. These guidelines, however, will hardly be sufficient to prevent different
national standards. Cf. Ohly, supra note 59, 784, van der Laan, supra note 88, pp.
608–9.
trademark use existed in any event where the trader buying keyword advertis-
ing services used another’s trademark in such a way that a link was established
with the goods or services offered in the keyword advertisement.95 In
L’Oréal/eBay, the Court had the opportunity to further elaborate on that point
with regard to the keyword advertising made by eBay. By selecting keywords
corresponding to L’Oréal trademarks, eBay had sought to draw the attention
of users of the Google search engine to L’Oréal products offered for sale on
the website www.ebay.co.uk. The promoted goods, obviously, were offered by
eBay’s customers and not by eBay itself. Invoking the general rule that the
establishment of a mere link with the eBay online marketplace was suffi-
cient,96 the Court, nonetheless, came to the conclusion that eBay made rele-
vant trademark use. Although the goods concerned were offered by third
parties, eBay’s advertisements created ‘an obvious association between the
trade-marked goods which are mentioned in the advertisements and the possi-
bility of buying those goods through eBay.’97 Triggering a mere association
with the trademark, in other words, was deemed sufficient to establish trade-
mark use.
Further incentive schemes in EU trademark law for a generous approach
to infringement criteria can be identified in the field of anti-dilution protection
under Art. 5(2) TMD. The low threshold established by the CJEU with regard
to the central eligibility criterion of ‘having a reputation’, for instance, has
been criticized above as a missed opportunity to confine problematic protec-
tion against dilution to those trademarks that are likely to be blurred, tarnished,
or unfairly exploited. The low standard of niche reputation developed by the
CJEU, however, may be deemed compatible with relevant international norms
and soft law recommendations.98 If Art. 16(3) TRIPS is read to formally
recognize the trademark dilution doctrine, the indications given in Art. 16(2)
TRIPS and Art. 2(2) of the WIPO Joint Recommendation Concerning
Provisions on the Protection of Well-Known Marks suggest a rather low stan-
dard, according to which niche knowledge among only one specific target
group of the products marketed under the trademark – consumers, distributors,
or other business circles – is sufficient.99
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al., para. 72.
96 See CJEU, 12 July 2011, case C-324/09, L’Oréal/eBay, para. 92.
97 See CJEU, ibid, para. 93.
98 See Senftleben, supra note 4, 50–3.
99 See WIPO Joint Recommendation Concerning Provisions on the Protection of
Well-Known Marks, WIPO publication No. 833, Geneva 2000, online available at
<http://www.wipo.int/about-ip/en/development_iplaw/>. Cf. A. Kur (1999), ‘Die
WIPO-Vorschläge zum Schutz bekannter und berühmter Marken’, Gewerblicher
Additional incentives for a niche reputation approach can be identified in
the EU. In a regional common market with national sub-markets that differ
considerably in size, a niche approach offers equal access to anti-dilution
protection because it constitutes the smallest common denominator. A stan-
dard of nationwide reputation, arguably, would require less effort in small EU
Member States. Community-wide reputation, by contrast, may be beyond
reach for brands stemming from small countries.100 Practical considerations of
this nature may induce the CJEU to set a low threshold for the required terri-
torial expansion of a mark’s reputation even in the case of Community trade-
marks that enjoy protection across the entire EU territory. The Pago decision
of the Court points in this direction.101
Considering these various incentives, it would be naive to assume that the
Court is prepared to limit trademark rights to basic protection against confu-
sion with minor extensions concerning dilution. By contrast, the Court is
likely to stick to the expansion of trademark protection at least in respect of
the flexible concept of trademark use and the low standard of ‘having a repu-
tation’. The doors to brand protection will thus remain wide open. In the field
of infringement criteria, the Court already refused adopting a stricter approach
to unfair advantage under Art. 5(2) TMD in Interflora/Marks & Spencer.102
Moreover, the Court confirmed in this decision its intention to protect commu-
nication, investment, and advertising functions in the context of Art. 5(1)(a)
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Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht, 866. With regard to the question whether Article 16(3)
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see particularly M. Handler, ‘Trademark Dilution in Australia?’, European Intellectual
Property Review 2007, p. 307. For further commentary on the TRIPS provisions, see
N. Pires de Carvalho (2011), The TRIPS Regime of Trademarks and Designs,
Austin/Boston/Chicago/New York: Wolters Kluwer, pp. 343–82; D. Gervais (2008),
The TRIPS Agreement: Drafting History and Analysis, 3rd ed., London: Sweet &
Maxwell, 274–9; A. Kur (1996), ‘TRIPS and Trademark Law’, in F.-K.Beier and G.
Schricker (eds), From GATT to TRIPs – The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights, Studies in Industrial Property and Copyright Law, Vol. 18,
Weinheim, p. 93 at pp. 107–8).
100 A requirement of Community-wide reputation could not be established under
the Trademark Directive anyway. Art. 5(2) TMD refers to trademarks having ‘a repu-
tation in the Member State’ (emphasis added).
101 See CJEU, 6 October 2009, case C-301/07, Pago/Tirolmilch, para. 29: ‘As the
present case concerns a Community trade mark with a reputation throughout the terri-
tory of a Member State, namely Austria, the view may be taken, regard being had to
the circumstances of the main proceedings, that the territorial requirement imposed by
Article 9(1)(c) of the regulation is satisfied.’ As to the territorial scope of prohibitions
against infringement, see CJEU, 12 April 2011, case C-235/09, DHL/Chronopost, paras
46–50.
102 See CJEU, 22 September 2011, case C-323/09, Interflora/Marks & Spencer,
para. 89.
TMD.103 Hence, a fundamental departure from L’Oréal/Bellure, in the sense
of a return to the high dilution threshold established in Intel/CPM and the
abandoning of the newly created function theory, cannot be expected.
Trademark rights in the EU, in other words, are not unlikely to remain rela-
tively close to exploitation rights granted in other fields of intellectual prop-
erty.
6. NEED FOR A NEW LIMITATION INFRASTRUCTURE
Given this low probability for a fundamental departure from the problematic
status quo, the time is ripe to devise appropriate limitations on trademark
rights instead of waiting for the CJEU to change its expansionist course.104 On
the basis of the foregoing analysis, the need for a new limitation infrastructure
in trademark law is evident for at least three reasons.
Firstly, the architecture of the Trademark Directive was not designed to
counterbalance the current scope of protection. As explained above, the
Directive focuses on protection against confusion. Against this background, it
is not surprising that the Directive specifically provides breathing space for the
use of (trade) names and addresses, descriptive indications, and indications of
the purpose of products in Art. 6 TMD, whereas it remains silent on other
fundamental concerns, such as safeguards for freedom of expression and infor-
mation. As the extension of the notion of trademark use to referential and deco-
rative use was not necessarily foreseeable, precautions in this regard seemed
dispensable. Only the anti-dilution regime in Art. 5(2) TMD was equipped with
the flexible defence of ‘due cause’ that can be invoked to satisfy freedom of
speech interests. This flexible defence, however, cannot generally be applied to
all exclusive rights. It is confined to the regulation of brand protection in Art.
5(2) TMD. The moment the Court incorporates brand protection into other
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However, as the scope of trademark protection expands and the metes and bounds
of protection become more uncertain, we cannot rely exclusively on creative inter-
pretation of the prima facie cause of action to establish limits. Trademark law must
more consciously develop defenses that reflect the competing values at stake in
trademark disputes.
exclusive rights,105 the system, therefore, inevitably becomes imbalanced. The
newly introduced protection of typical brand functions under Art. 5(1)(a)
TMD testifies to this weak point in the architecture of the Trademark
Directive.
Secondly, it was not foreseeable that the Court would use the Trademark
Directive to absorb more and more unfair competition law. With the extension
of the notion of trademark use to referential and decorative use, the Court
brought forms of use ‘other than for the purposes of distinguishing goods or
services’ under the umbrella of harmonized EU trademark protection stan-
dards. Considering Art. 5(5) TMD, it becomes clear that these forms of use
were not intended to fall under the harmonized rights of trademark owners. By
contrast, Art. 5(5) seeks to leave national provisions dealing with ‘other use’
unaffected by the harmonized provisions in Art. 5(1) to (4) TMD.106 If
Member States decide to include forms of other use in their trademark statutes,
Art. 5(5) TMD, moreover, ensures appropriate counterbalances by also
providing for the flexible defence of ‘due cause’. The CJEU, however,
included referential and decorative use in the general notion of trademark use.
In consequence, these forms of use become subject to the much less flexible
Art. 5(1) TMD that grants exclusive rights without providing for an open
defence that can be used to safeguard freedom of speech. As discussed above,
particularly Art. 5(1)(a) TMD can easily become too heavy a burden for
comparative advertising and parody. In the absence of a due cause defence, the
breathing space for (commercial) freedom of expression is insufficient in this
area of protection.
Thirdly, the existing limitations in the EU Trademark Directive are not
necessarily applied in an efficient way by the CJEU. In Portakabin/
Primakabin, for instance, the Court had to decide on the selection of the trade-
mark PORTAKABIN (and variations with minor spelling mistakes) for
Primakabin’s advertising of the sale of new and second-hand mobile building
units, including those manufactured by Portakabin. To defend this keyword
advertising, Primakabin invoked the exemption of the use of descriptive indi-
cations and indications of the purpose of products in Art. 6(1)(b) and (c) TMD,
as well as the exhaustion of trademark rights under Art. 7 TMD. These limita-
tions require compliance with a loyalty obligation in the sense of use of the
trademark in accordance with honest practices in industrial or commercial
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matters. Instead of applying these rules flexibly to create an efficient counter-
balance to continuously expanding trademark rights, the CJEU aligned the
loyalty obligation with the applicable infringement criteria. Recalling the
above-described market transparency obligation imposed on keyword adver-
tisers in Google France and Bergspechte, the Court concluded that keyword
advertisers could not rely on the limitations in Arts. 6(1) and 7 TMD, if the
advertisement was vague to such an extent that Internet users were unable to
determine whether the advertiser was a third party vis-à-vis the trademark
proprietor or, on the contrary, an economically linked undertaking.107
While the conclusion as such may be reasonable, it is remarkable that the
Court uses exactly the same considerations which support a finding of
infringement, to reject the application of the limitations in Arts. 6(1) and 7
TMD. Defences must have an independent meaning different from relevant
infringement criteria. Otherwise, a finding of infringement inevitably
precludes the invocation of limitations and renders them meaningless. In
Portakabin/Primakabin, the CJEU only partly complies with this basic prereq-
uisite for balanced trademark protection. The Court admitted that in excep-
tional cases, Art. 6(1) TMD may still be available even though there is some
likelihood of confusion.108 In the case of Art. 7 TMD, the indication ‘used’ or
‘second-hand’ would be unproblematic. Moreover, Primakabin could not
necessarily be prevented from including, in the marketing message appearing
as a result of a search for ‘Portakabin’, second-hand goods bearing other trade-
marks.109 With these additional considerations, the Court created loopholes for
resellers. A real counterbalance to broad trademark protection, however,
would require more flexibility.
The corrosive effect of these shortcomings in the architecture and applica-
tion of the Trademark Directive must not be underestimated. Once the door to
scrutiny in the light of trademark rights is opened wide on the basis of a broad
concept of trademark use, the continuous relaxation of infringement require-
ments in recent years enhances the risk of a rash finding of infringement.
Without appropriate defences, the reaction of EU trademark law to forms of
referential and decorative use, for instance for the purposes of comparative
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and 81.
108 See CJEU, ibid, para. 71, referring to CJEU, 7 January 2004, case C-100/02,
Gerolsteiner/Putsch, paras 25–26, in which the Court explained that ‘[t]he mere fact
that there exists a likelihood of aural confusion between a word mark registered in one
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109 See CJEU, supra note 107, paras 84 and 91.
advertising and parody, will most probably be too harsh. Therefore, an
enhanced limitation infrastructure is needed to re-establish a proper balance
between rights and freedoms.
In fact, the process of devising new limitations has already started. In
O2/Hutchison, the CJEU itself took first steps to create additional breathing
space for comparative advertising:
Consequently, in order to reconcile the protection of registered marks and the use
of comparative advertising, Article 5(1) and (2) of Directive 89/104 and Article
3a(1) of Directive 84/450 must be interpreted to the effect that the proprietor of a
registered trade mark is not entitled to prevent the use, by a third party, of a sign
identical with, or similar to, his mark, in a comparative advertisement which satis-
fies all the conditions, laid down in Article 3a(1) of Directive 84/450, under which
comparative advertising is permitted.110
As pointed out above, the Court confirmed this new limitation in
L’Oréal/Bellure.111 In this context, the rules of the EC Comparative
Advertisement Directive are openly applied as an external balancing tool that
is not reflected in harmonized EU trademark law itself.112 The explicit recog-
nition of this new limitation in EU trademark law would give evidence of the
particular importance attached to commercial freedom of speech in the context
of trademark protection.113
With regard to parody, criticism and comment,114 comparable external
170 Constructing European intellectual property
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112 In O2/Hutchison, the CJEU could establish a link between the prohibition of
confusion in Art. 3a(1)(d) of the Comparative Advertisement Directive and the likeli-
hood of confusion test in Art. 5(1)(b) TMD. See CJEU, 12 June 2008, case C-533/06,
O2/Hutchison, para. 69 and operative part. The balancing via external norms was less
obvious under these circumstances.
113 Cf. Max Planck Institute, supra note 59, paras 2.260–2.262, proposing the
inclusion of an explicit limitation regarding honest referential use that, besides compar-
ative advertising, would cover use for purposes of indicating replacement or service,
use for purposes of commentary and criticism, and parody.
114 For case law reflecting the need for appropriate balancing tools, see the afore-
mentioned cases of the German Federal Court of Justice, 3 February 2005, case I ZR
159/02, Lila Postkarte, Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht 2005, 583, and
11 March 2008, case VI ZR 7/07, Gen-Milch, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 2008,
2110, both online available at www.bundesgerichtshof.de. See also District Court of
Amsterdam, 22 December 2006, case KG ZA 06-2120, Denk vooruit, Intellectuele
eigendom en reclamerecht 2007, 139; Paris Court of Appeals, 14th chamber, Sec. A, 26
February 2003, Greenpeace France/Esso and SPCEA/Greenpeace et al., IIC 35 (2004),
342; Constitutional Court of South Africa, 27 May 2005, Laugh it Off Promotions CC
v South African Breweries Int. (Finance) B.V. t/a Sabmark Int., case CCT 42/04, IIC 36
(2005), 868. Cf. Z.M. Navsa (2009), ‘Trademark Dilution – No Laughing Matter’,
balancing tools are not readily available. The EC Copyright Directive115
provides for limitations for the purposes of criticism and review, and carica-
ture, parody and pastiche.116 However, in spite of the growing overlap
between the two fields of intellectual property,117 copyright and trademark law
are not intertwined to such an extent that copyright limitations could generally
be applied analogously in trademark law.118 Instead, the CJEU would have to
directly invoke the fundamental guarantee of freedom of expression in Art. 11
of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and Art. 10 of the European
Convention on Human Rights.119 Therefore, the need to enshrine appropriate
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115 Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22
May 2001, on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the
information society (OJ 2001 L 167, 10).
116 See Art. 5(3)(d) and (k) of the Copyright Directive.
117 With regard to cumulative copyright and trademark protection, see S. Carre,
‘Marques et droit d’auteur: Métaphore d’une belle rencontre’, in Geiger and Schmidt-
Szalewski, supra note 18, p. 25; M.R.F. Senftleben (2010), ‘Der kulturelle Imperativ
des Urheberrechts’, in M. Weller, N.B. Kemle and Th. Dreier (eds), Kunst im Markt –
Kunst im Recht, Baden-Baden: Nomos; V. Vanovermeire (2009), ‘Inschrijving als merk
van een in het openbaar domein gevallen werk’, in A. Cruquenaire and S. Dusollier
(eds), Le cumul des droits intellectuels, Brussels: Larcier, p. 177; A. Ohly (2007),
‘Areas of Overlap Between Trade Mark Rights, Copyright and Design Rights in
German Law’, Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht International, 704;
D.W.F. Verkade (1998), ‘The Cumulative Effect of Copyright Law and Trademark
Law: Which Takes Precedence?’, in J.J.C. Kabel and G.J.H.M. Mom (eds), Intellectual
Property and Information Law – Essays in Honour of Herman Cohen Jehoram, Den
Haag, London and Boston: Kluwer, p. 69; J.H. Spoor (1990), De gestage groei van
merk, werk en uitvinding, Zwolle: Tjeenk Willink.
118 This may be advisable, however, in cases where both rights apply cumula-
tively. Cf. M.R.F. Senftleben (2007), ‘De samenloop van auteurs- en merkenrecht – een
internationaal perspectief’, Tijdschrift voor auteurs-, media- en informatierecht, 67;
P.B. Hugenholtz (2000), ‘Over cumulatie gesproken’, Bijblad bij de industriële eigen-
dom, 240.
119 With regard to the impact of the fundamental guarantee of freedom of expres-
sion on trademark protection, see the in-depth analysis conducted by Sakulin, supra
note 21, and C. Geiger, ‘Marques et droits fondamentaux’, in Geiger and Schmidt-
Szalewski, supra note 18, p. 163; L. Timbers and J. Huston (2003), ‘The “Artistic
Relevance Test” Just Became Relevant: the Increasing Strength of the First
Amendment as a Defense to Trademark Infringement and Dilution’, Trade Mark
Reporter, 93, 1278; R. Cooper Dreyfuss (2008), ‘Reconciling Trademark Rights and
Expressive Values: How to Stop Worrying and Learn to Love Ambiguity’, in G.B.
Dinwoodie and M.D. Janis (eds), Trademark Law and Theory: a Handbook of
Contemporary Research, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar
Publishing, p. 261.
defences for parody, criticism and comment in EU trademark law can be
deemed even more pressing than in the case of comparative advertising where
the specific rules laid down in the Comparative Advertisement Directive are
readily available.
Inspiration for this internalization of safeguards for freedom of expression
can be found, for instance, in the US trademark system. After the US Supreme
Court required ‘a showing of actual dilution, rather than a likelihood of dilu-
tion’ in Moseley v V Secret Catalogue,120 the 2006 Trademark Dilution
Revision Act amended the anti-dilution provisions in the US Lanham Act. The
threshold for giving proof of dilution was lowered in this context.121
Accordingly, the question of appropriate counterbalances arose and led to the
introduction of a statutory, open-ended fair use provision that explicitly offers
breathing space for parody, criticism and comment. To safeguard the freedom
of the press, the provision also limits trademark rights with regard to news
reporting and news commentary.122
When comparable limitations are included in EU trademark law, these new
limitations should be brought in line with existing limitations in the EC
Copyright Directive that serve the same purposes.123 In this way, a consistent
system of corresponding limitations can be created that prevents the erosion of
the freedom offered in copyright law in cases of overlap with trademark
protection.124
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Secret: Wither Dilution Under the Federal Dilution Act’, Trademark Reporter, 93,
842–59.
121 See Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006 (H.R. 683) amending the US
Trademark Act of 1946 (15 U.S.C. 1125). With regard to the required proof of dilution,
this new legislation clarifies that protection against dilution is to be granted ‘regardless
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economic injury’. Cf. Beebe, supra note 26, 1143; C. Chicoine and J. Visintine (2006),
‘The Role of State Trademark Dilution Statutes in Light of the Trademark Dilution
Revision Act 2006’, The Trademark Reporter, 96, 1155.
122 See Section 43(c)(3) of the US Lanham Act, as amended by the 2006
Trademark Dilution Revision Act. For a description of the situation under the former
US Federal Trademark Dilution Act, see M.K. Cantwell (2004), ‘Confusion, Dilution
and Speech: First Amendment Limitations on the Trademark Estate: An Update’, The
Trademark Reporter, 94, 549. With regard to common law fair use defences in the US,
see J. Moskin (2005), ‘Frankenlaw: The Supreme Court’s Fair and Balanced Look at
Fair Use’, Trademark Reporter, 95, 848.
123 See the aforementioned Art. 5(3)(d) and (k) of the Copyright Directive
2001/29/EC. With regard to use privileges for the press, see Art. 5(3)(c) of the
Copyright Directive covering the reporting of current events.
124 Cf. M.R.F. Senftleben (2011), ‘Overprotection and Protection Overlaps in
Intellectual Property Law: The Need for Horizontal Fair Use Defences’, in A. Kur and
Finally, it is remarkable that, besides the aforementioned specific limita-
tions, the US provision generally exempts ‘[a]ny fair use, including nomina-
tive or descriptive fair use, or facilitation of such use.’125 This safety net of an
open-ended limitation recalls the general defence of ‘due cause’ in Art. 5(2)
TMD. The US example shows that, irrespective of the introduction of several
specific limitations, it is advisable to also provide for a general safeguard
clause that can be invoked in the case of new, unforeseen developments that
require additional balancing tools.126 With a general limitation of this type,
courts are rendered capable of reacting adequately to new technologies. The
problems raised by keyword advertising can serve as an example in this
regard. As trademark rights become broader, they also become more likely to
absorb forms of use that serve important competing interests and should
remain free for this reason. In this situation, the safety net of a flexible defence
enables the courts to maintain a proper balance between rights and free-
doms.127 As pointed out above, the CJEU relied on the flexible ‘due cause’
defence in Interflora/Marks & Spencer to create breathing space for keyword
advertising informing consumers about alternative offers in the market.128
A comparable need for additional flexibility may arise, for instance, with
regard to research and teaching, and the use of trademarks for cultural
purposes. Admittedly, activities in these fields do not necessarily occur ‘in the
context of commercial activity with a view to economic advantage and not as
a private matter.’129 Accordingly, they may be unlikely to constitute ‘use in the
course of trade’ in the sense of EU trademark law and would remain outside
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125 See Section 43(c)(3) of the US Lanham Act, as amended by the 2006
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127 For a more detailed discussion of this point, see Senftleben, supra note 124,
pp. 170–9.
128 See CJEU, 22 September 2011, case C-323/09, Interflora/Marks & Spencer,
para. 91.
129 For this definition of ‘use in the course of trade’, see CJEU, 23 March 2010,
cases C-236/08-238/08, Google/Louis Vuitton et al., para. 50; CJEU, 12 November
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the reach of trademark rights from the outset.130 With increasing partnerships
between private companies and educational, scientific, and cultural institu-
tions, however, the absence of use in trade may become less evident, while the
socially valuable objectives of sponsored activities still justify an exemption
from the control exerted by trademark owners. In the case of cultural activi-
ties, it can be added that freedom of art may be understood to cover accompa-
nying promotion and marketing activities.131 From this perspective, it would
also make sense not to rely exclusively on an exemption based on the condi-
tion of use in the course of trade.
A final lesson can be learned from the limited scope of the due cause
defence in the current Trademark Directive. As indicated above, this open
defence only applies to brand protection under Art. 5(2) TMD and the exten-
sion of trademark protection to use ‘other than for the purposes of distin-
guishing goods or services’ under Art. 5(5) TMD. As the CJEU decided to
offer brand protection and protection against other use also under Art. 5(1)(a)
TMD, this limited scope of the defence led to imbalanced protection. Against
this background, it is advisable to generalize this safety net and render the due
cause defence applicable across all exclusive rights granted in EU trademark
law. The proposed specific limitations for the purposes of comparative adver-
tising, criticism and review, caricature,132 parody and pastiche, and the report-
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131 For an approach to the fundamental freedom of art covering both creation
(‘Werkbereich’) and dissemination (‘Wirkbereich’), see German Federal Constitutional
Court, 3 November 1987, case 1 BvR 1257/84, Herrnburger Bericht, published in the
official collection BVerfGE 77 (1987), 240, where the Court held that the freedom of
art covered advertising for a work of art. If the trademark of a third party is used for
the purpose of advertising an art work, this freedom of art, necessarily, must be recon-
ciled with the fundamental guarantee of property, including intellectual property. Cf.
H.D. Jarass and B. Pieroth (2010), Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland –
Kommentar, 11th ed., Munich: C.H. Beck, pp. 207–12. A new trademark limitation
regulating this field could provide guidance for an appropriate balancing of interests in
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rights, see the critical comments by C. Geiger (2009), ‘Intellectual Property Shall be
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132 The reference to caricature stems from Art. 5(3)(k) of the EC Copyright
Directive and is proposed here, as pointed out above, also in the context of trademark
law to harmonize the limitation infrastructure in the two – often overlapping – fields of
intellectual property law. While the category of caricature may perhaps be deemed less
ing of current events should also be implemented as defences that can be
applied to all exclusive rights. In other words, these specific limitations and
the open due cause defence should be added to the catalogue of limitations in
Art. 6 TMD.
7. CONCLUSION
In recent years, the CJEU has broadened the scope and reach of EU trademark
protection constantly, in particular in the area of brand protection. Developing
a flexible concept of trademark use that encompasses referential and decora-
tive use, the Court opened the doors to trademark protection wide. With the
adoption of a remarkably low threshold for a showing of reputation, these
doors are kept wide open also with regard to enhanced protection against dilu-
tion. In addition, the Court found mere attempts to ride on the coat-tails of a
mark with a reputation to amount to trademark infringement under Art. 5(2)
TMD. Use having an adverse effect on typical functions of marks with a repu-
tation – communication, investment, and advertising functions – became
actionable under Art. 5(1)(a) TMD.
This systematic relaxation of eligibility and infringement criteria can
hardly be justified. The rationales underlying the protection of brand invest-
ment and brand communication are rather weak. In particular, the incentive
and reward rationales that serve as a basis for exploitation rights in other fields
of intellectual property are inapplicable in this context. Unlike inventors and
authors, the brand owner cannot validly claim to have created intellectual
property that furthers science or art. The trademark does not fall into the public
domain after a limited period of time to enrich mankind’s universal treasury of
intellectual creations. Against this background, it remains unclear why the
CJEU paved the way for more generous and readily available brand protec-
tion. With these steps, the Court approximated trademark rights to exploitation
rights without a sound policy justification.
With the challenges arising in the digital environment, the imbalances
caused by this jurisprudence clearly come to the fore. As the limitations recog-
nized within the EU trademark system are incapable of coping with the exces-
sive protection following from the extensions in recent years, the CJEU had to
invoke the rules of the Comparative Advertisement Directive as an external
balancing tool to create breathing space for comparative advertising. To offer
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even more space, the Court supplemented the application of the Comparative
Advertisement Directive with an open-ended ‘due cause’ defence that also
serves the purpose of informing customers about alternatives in the market. It
remains to be seen whether the Court will develop comparable balancing
mechanisms with regard to parody, criticism, and comment. Otherwise, an
encroachment upon freedom of expression and information seems inevitable.
While the questions raised by keyword advertising may lead to the devel-
opment of a more nuanced coat-tail formula in the context of Art. 5(2) TMD,
and a cautious approach to the function theory governing Art. 5(1)(a) TMD, a
fundamental departure from L’Oréal/Bellure, in the sense of a return to a high
threshold for anti-dilution protection, cannot be expected. By contrast, trade-
mark rights in the EU are not unlikely to remain relatively close to exploita-
tion rights granted in other fields of intellectual property. Furthermore, the
CJEU is unlikely to change its expansionist course in the area of eligibility
criteria. A broad concept of trademark use allows the Court to bring more and
more non-harmonized unfair competition law under the umbrella of harmo-
nized EU trademark law. The lax reputation test in the field of anti-dilution
protection may be deemed inevitable to offer equal access to anti-dilution
protection in a regional common market with national sub-markets that differ
considerably in size. The doors to generous brand protection will thus remain
wide open.
For this reason, the time is ripe to devise an appropriate limitation infra-
structure that is capable of counterbalancing the broad grant of protection. The
limitation for comparative advertising that the Court deduced from the
Comparative Advertisement Directive should be reflected in EU trademark
law. Additional limitations are indispensable with regard to criticism and
review, and caricature, parody and pastiche. To secure the freedom of the
press, they should be accompanied by safeguards for the reporting of current
events. Measures could also be taken with regard to the use of trademarks for
research, teaching, and cultural purposes. In any case, the updated limitation
infrastructure should provide for a general due cause defence that can be used
in unforeseen circumstances requiring the further limitation of trademark
rights. As the CJEU tends to trespass across the boundary lines between
protection against confusion in Art. 5(1) TMD and protection against dilution
in Art. 5(2) TMD, the new limitations and the general due cause defence
should be applicable across all exclusive rights of trademark owners. They
should be added to the list in Art. 6 TMD.
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